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THE COMPLAINT CONUNDRUM: THOUGHTS
ON THE CFPB’S COMPLAINT MECHANISM
Katherine Porter*
The law requires the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to
collect, monitor, and respond to consumer complaints regarding consumer
financial products or services. This Article explores these duties. Its
premise is that the CFPB’s complaint mechanism, even if carefully
designed and heavily resourced, is unlikely to improve the overall level of
consumer protection. While taking complaints will aid the CFPB in some of
its duties, it also could erode some aspects of consumer protection. Those
counterintuitive possibilities bring into sharper relief the issue of whether it
is appropriate to task administrative agencies with resolving consumer
complaints. What is the purpose of making the government—other than the
court system—address complaints with nongovernment actors? The Article
considers this fundamental question in the context of the CFPB, identifying
theoretical and practical issues raised by the CFPB’s strategies to date for
handling consumer complaints.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is heralded as a
victory for consumers. It represents a commitment from the federal
government to be attentive to the concerns of people as they engage in
financial transactions. The CFPB should give consumers an ally and a
resource in the credit marketplace. Its rule-writing, examination, and
enforcement duties were hard-fought by its proponents and remain
controversial, and perhaps unwelcome, by its critics. One of the CFPB’s
major duties, however, receives universal praise. Its obligation to address
complaints from consumers about financial transactions was supported by
industry,1 advocates,2 and politicians.3
The CFPB solves a major problem with the prior complaint regime for
financial transactions. Because of fractured regulatory authority, consumers
had difficulty identifying the appropriate agency to submit a complaint.
With consolidated authority in the CFPB, there is a one-stop shop for
aggrieved consumers. This victory seems to have satisfied all parties. But it
* Professor of Law at UC Irvine School of Law.

1. Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America’s New
Economic Foundation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th
Cong. 79 (2009) (statement of Edward L. Yingling, President and Chief Executive Officer,
American Bankers Association) [hereinafter Hearing].
2. Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 145 (2009) (statement of Travis Plunkett,
Consumer Fed’n of America and Edmund Mierzwinski, U.S. PIRG).
3. Id. at 1 (remarks of Congressman Barney Frank).
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may also have blinded them to other, quite challenging issues with the
CFPB’s complaint duties.
The goal of this Article is to explore the purpose of a government-run
consumer complaint mechanism and analyze its potential benefits and risks.
I describe the law requiring the CFPB to develop a complaint mechanism
and the CFPB’s approach to implementing those duties. I then articulate
several reasons why the government might be tasked with hearing and
responding to complaints that consumers make against nongovernment
actors; I examine those reasons against the larger framework of consumer
protection. I conclude that the CFPB’s complaint mechanism is not a clear
victory for all. It will be difficult to achieve its potential, and even at best,
taking complaints could undermine certain aspects of consumer protection.
I. STATUTORY DUTIES REGARDING COMPLAINTS
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act) that creates the CFPB prescribes a rough architecture for
the CFPB. It mandates that the CFPB have six specific units.4 The
congressional requirement to have a particular unit likely reflects a strong
consensus about the importance of that unit’s duties. While the CPFB could
be structured differently over time, such as by the addition of divisions,
Congress is clear that the six statutory units must remain identifiable
components. This ensures that these assigned tasks remain a visible part of
the Bureau.
A complaint mechanism is one of the CFPB’s required units. The
statute spells out the basic obligations of the CFPB complaint unit.
(3) Collecting and Tracking Complaints.—
(A) In General.—The Director shall establish a unit whose functions shall
include establishing a single, toll-free telephone number, a website, and a
database or utilizing an existing database to facilitate the centralized
collection of, monitoring of, and response to consumer complaints
regarding consumer financial products or services. . . .5

The statute establishes three core tasks that the CFPB must perform
with respect to complaints: collecting them, monitoring them, and
responding to them. In later sections, the statute gives a comparatively high
level of detail about how these tasks shall be executed. The result is that the
CFPB has less flexibility in designing how to address consumer complaints
than it enjoys for some of its other duties. Using the three duties—
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111–203, § 1013, 124 Stat. 1376, 1966 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493 (2010))
(requiring units dedicated to research, community affairs, collecting and tracking complaints, fair
lending and equal opportunity, financial education, service members’ affairs, and older
Americans’ affairs).
5. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1969.
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collecting, monitoring, and responding—as a framework, I explore the
statutory obligations of the CFPB against the prior regime for complaints.
A. CENTRALIZED CONTACT FOR CONSUMERS
The CFPB’s first charge regarding complaints is to “collect” them. At
minimum, this means that the CFPB must take consumer complaints. This
obligation is unsurprising, given that under prior law, most financial
regulators were required to take consumer complaints.6
The major weakness of the prior regime was that consumers struggled
to identify the appropriate regulator to contact. For a single financial
product, such as a home mortgage, the regulator could be one of a dozen
agencies and could be either state or federal. Because these regulators each
had responsibility for the same financial products, 7 an aggrieved consumer
with a mortgage problem would have to research the identity of the party
selling the mortgage to know where to direct a complaint. To address this
issue, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council created a web
page where consumers type in the name of their financial institution and are
given the name of its regulator.8 Yet, consumers had to know about this
site’s existence, learn the correct name of their institution, be sure their
institution was not a credit union (because those are not covered by the
site), and then track down contact information for the appropriate
regulator’s complaint mechanism.
The fractured regulatory authority hampered consumers who tried to
complain about financial services to the government. At the Federal
Reserve Board in 2000, more than half of all complaints were referred to
other agencies.9 Even the banking industry conceded that reform was
needed. The American Bankers Association, which strenuously opposed a
separate consumer regulator, supported the creation of a “centralized call
center for consumers that could forward complaints to the right agency and
serve as a coordinated information source.”10
The CFPB consolidated authority for consumer protection and
reoriented it to be based on the product sold, rather than the offering party.
If the problem is a consumer financial product, then the consumer can

6. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (2006), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act § 1092(3), 124 Stat. at 2095
(requiring that major prudential regulators receive complaints).
7. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007, at 16 (“Consumer
financial products are regulated based, principally, on the identity of the issuer, rather than the
nature of the product.”).
8. FFIEC’s Consumer Help Center, FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, http://www
.ffiec.gov/consumercenter/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
9. Jeanne M. Hogarth & Maureen P. English, Consumer Complaints and Redress: An
Important Mechanism for Protecting and Empowering Consumers, 26 INT’L J. CONSUMER
STUDIES 217, 220 (2002).
10. Hearing, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Edward L. Yingling).
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contact the CFPB regardless of which entity licenses or supervises the
business.
The statute contains several directives aimed at reducing consumer
confusion about where to submit complaints. The CFPB must provide
telephone access via a “single” telephone number.11 This improves the prior
regulatory situation, in which a consumer might have to call several
prudential regulators to determine which one had oversight over the
financial actor that had aggrieved them. The statute also specifies the
“centralized collection of, monitoring of, and response to consumer
complaints.”12 Congress clearly wanted the CFPB to be a single portal of
entry for consumers with complaints.
The statute does recognize that the CFPB may not, in fact, be the
appropriate regulator for some consumer complaints. It provides that “the
Director shall coordinate with the Federal Trade Commission or other
Federal agencies to route complaints to such agencies,”13 and that state
agencies may receive routed calls about “appropriate complaints.”14 The
description of the permitted procedure as “routing” complaints is consistent
with the idea that the CFPB must be available as an initial first point of
contact for consumers.
A single portal for consumer complaints is a natural result of the
consolidation of authority in the CFPB. Thus, the mere creation of the
CFPB resolves the major “complaint” about the handling of complaints. On
this issue, the CFPB clearly represents an advance over the prior system.
B. CREATING COMPLAINT DATA
The second duty of the CFPB is to “monitor” complaints. The contours
of this duty are somewhat unclear. The subsection’s title uses the phrase
“collect and track,” and perhaps “monitor” and “track” are synonyms. The
monitoring duty seems to require that, at minimum, the CFPB cannot just
take complaints. It must do something to understand their origin, content,
and disposition. The statute also requires an annual report to Congress on
the prior year’s complaints. “Such report shall include information and
analysis about complaint numbers, complaint types, and, where applicable,
information about resolution of complaints.”15 This type of monitoring is
mostly a counting task. It does not seem to require the CFPB to track how
any particular complaint is being handled. Rather, its purpose seems to be
to work in tandem with the collecting task to ensure that the CFPB is
“hearing” the public’s negative experiences with financial products.
11. Dodd-Frank Act § 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1969 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5493(b)(3)(A)).
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(B), 124 Stat. at 1969.
15. Id. § 1013(b)(3)(C), 124 Stat. at 1969.
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The monitoring duty has another aspect. The CFPB is required to share
consumer complaint information with the prudential regulators, the Federal
Trade Commission, other federal agencies, and state agencies.16 In turn,
those entities are required to share their consumer complaint data with the
CFPB.17 This aggregation is designed to “facilitate” the “supervision and
enforcement activities” of the CFPB, and to aid it in “monitoring of the
market for consumer financial products and services.”18 It appears that the
data sharing was designed to give the CFPB a comprehensive view of
consumers’ frustrations to allow it to better perform its oversight of
financial institutions. This is quite an entirely separate responsibility with
respect to consumer complaints than being responsive to aggrieved
consumers. Indeed, the CFPB could use information gleaned from
monitoring complaints to write a rule to eliminate a troublesome practice
without any actions whatsoever to acknowledge, respond to, or obtain
redress for any consumer on an individual level.
C. RESPONDING TO CONSUMERS
The CFPB’s third duty, however, is to respond to complaints. This
obligation was apparently not present in some early formulations of the
CFPB’s duties. In a hearing one year before the Dodd-Frank Act was
passed, a consumer advocate stated that while collecting and tracking
complaints was a “very important function,” the proposed agency should
also be “charged with resolving consumer complaints.”19 This history may
explain why the CFPB’s duty to respond to complaints appears in a separate
section of Title X of Dodd-Frank, one that is not even proximate to the
section discussed above on “collecting and tracking” complaints.
Section 1034 is titled “Response to Consumer Complaints and
Inquiries.” It imposes on the CFPB a duty to establish “reasonable
procedures to provide a timely response to consumers” who make
complaints.20 The statute describes the content of the response as
including—
(1) steps that have been taken by the regulator in response to the
complaint or inquiry of the consumer;
(2) any responses received by the regulator from the covered person [this
is the term for the businesses that the CFPB regulates]; and

16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. § 1013(b)(3)(D), 124 Stat. at 1969–70.
Id.
Id.
Hearing, supra note 1, at 99 (statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer
Fed’n of Am.).
20. Dodd-Frank Act § 1034(a), 124 Stat. at 2008 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5534).
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(3) any follow-up actions or planned follow-up actions by the regulator in
response to the complaint or inquiry of the consumer.21

There is a parallel statute that imposes identical duties on “covered
persons” to provide responses to the CFPB concerning complaints.22 These
laws establish a communication chain: businesses (a.k.a., covered persons)
must respond to the CFPB, and the CFPB must respond to consumers.
These duties do not mean that the consumer can simply rely on the CFPB to
negotiate with the business. The statute contemplates that the business will
work with the consumers to resolve the complaint and then must share
information on whether that process occurred and how it proceeded with the
CFPB for oversight.
This tripartite structure is less robust than it may appear at first blush.
While it imposes obligations to share information, it seemingly does not
require that any action occur with respect to consumer complaints. That is,
steps taken, responses received, or follow-up plans must be communicated
from business to the CFPB and from the CFPB to consumer but,
presumably, if the CFPB and the business take no action, they need only
communicate that fact in a “timely response.”23 Could the following letter
satisfy the CFPB’s statutory duty?
Dear Consumer:
We collected your complaint. We added it to our database. We have taken
no steps with respect to your complaint, have received no response from a
business regarding it, and do not plan any follow-up.
Sincerely,
Consumer Complaint Unit, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

It is possible, perhaps even likely, that Congress intended the statute to
impose an affirmative duty to do something more than generate such letters

21. Id.
22. Id. § 1034(b), 124 Stat. at 2009.
A covered person subject to supervision and primary enforcement by the Bureau
pursuant to section 1025 shall provide a timely response, in writing where appropriate,
to the Bureau, the prudential regulators, and any other agency having jurisdiction over
such covered person concerning a consumer complaint or inquiry, including—
(1) steps that have been taken by the covered person to respond to the complaint or
inquiry of the consumer;
(2) responses received by the covered person from the consumer; and
(3) follow-up actions or planned follow-up actions by the covered person to respond to
the complaint or inquiry of the consumer.).
Id.

23. Id. § 1304(a), 124 Stat. at 2008.
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in response to consumer complaints. And, of course, the CFPB in fact will
likely do much more than the statutory minimum.24
A weak duty to respond, however, may be the norm for government
action on consumer complaints.25 Under the prior regime for financial
regulators, many consumers did not receive any redress after complaining.
Since 1975, federal law has required the regulators of financial institutions
to address consumer complaints. “In order to prevent unfair or deceptive
acts or practices,” the regulators were to “establish a separate division of
consumer affairs which shall receive and take appropriate action upon
complaints.”26 The regulations fleshed out the concept of “appropriate
action” to require regulators to provide consumers “a substantive response
or an acknowledgment setting a reasonable time for a substantive response”
to be “sent to the individual making the complaint” within fifteen days after
receipt of a written complaint.27 The regulations do not seem to provide a
definition of substantive response.
Although it seems clear that more than an acknowledgement of receipt
of complaint was intended, consumer advocates reported that federal
regulators often took no action on complaints that were legitimate and
reflected serious or repeated violations.28 These problems with complaint
handling cannot be explained by the tremendous increase in the size and
influence of the financial industry nor the alleged nearly complete
regulatory capture of some entities, such as the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC). In the heyday of consumer protection—in 1976—a
congressional report found serious shortcomings in how consumer affairs
offices dealt with complaints.
None of the consumer affairs offices (or Washington offices of those
agencies without consumer affairs offices) become involved in the actual
investigation of the consumer complaints which they receive. . . . The
method of investigation of consumer complaints most frequently used by
all agencies is to request details concerning the complaint from the
financial institution complained about. This method puts primary reliance
on the financial institution’s version of the problem. Consumers are rarely

24. While the “timely response” should include the steps, responses, and follow-up actions, the
statute does not preclude a more comprehensive response.
25. An examination of government and nongovernment complaint systems concluded that
government systems are not significantly better. See generally Laura Nader, Disputing Without the
Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998 (1979).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(1), repealed by Dodd-Frank Act § 1092, 124 Stat. at 2094–95 (2010).
27. 12 C.F.R. § 227.2 (2012).
28. Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services—Consumer and Industry
Perspectives: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 43 (2007) (statement of
Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer Fed’n of Am.).
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contacted for additional details and examiners are rarely sent out to
conduct on-site investigations of consumer complaints.29

Thirty years later, the OCC was the subject of a similar study of its
complaint handling. The report’s title, OCC Consumer Assistance: Process
Is Similar to That of Other Regulators but Could Be Improved by Enhanced
Outreach, gives away the punch line.30 The Government Accountability
Office found that the OCC largely was like the other federal banking
regulators. It resolved most complaints by “providing information to
consumers” in the form of referring consumers to other regulators or
advising them to seek counsel.31 Consumers were required to submit a
written complaint form for the OCC to take action on the complaint; if the
consumer failed to do so, the OCC considered the complaint “withdrawn.”32
As a result of these procedures, consumers rarely received the “substantive
response” that seems to be required by regulation. In 2004, the OCC
reported only 20 percent of all complaints resolved; the remainder were
either marked as informational or withdrawn.33 This suggests that the OCC
actually investigated only a modest fraction of all complaints. The vast
majority of consumers contacting a prudential regulator with a complaint
did not receive a response that reflected any investigation.
The efficacy of the regulators in dealing with complaints was contested.
An article describing the Federal Reserve Board’s process states that it does
“look into every complaint.”34 The agencies did have dozens of employees
in complaint departments, and millions of dollars were spent in aggregate
on collecting and responding to consumers’ complaints about financial
institutions.
Because it was created to improve the level of consumer protection and
to address criticisms of prudential regulators, the CFPB almost certainly has
a heavier burden to respond to complaints than the prior regulators. The
statute requires a “response” rather than an “appropriate action”—a pretty
clear effort from Congress to ensure that individual consumers receive more
help after complaining. The exact nature of that help remains unclear,

29. STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., DO FINANCIAL
REGULATORY AGENCIES LISTEN TO CONSUMERS? 1–2 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Staff
Report] (emphasis omitted).
30. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-293, OCC CONSUMER ASSISTANCE:
PROCESS SIMILAR TO THAT OF OTHER REGULATORS BUT COULD BE IMPROVED BY ENHANCED
OUTREACH (2006).
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 15.
34. FRB: Current FAQs, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www
.federalreserve.gov/faqs/credit_12666.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
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however, as difficult challenges will confront the CFPB in carrying out its
statutory duties to collect, monitor, and respond to complaints.35
II. CFPB’S APPROACH TO COMPLAINTS
The CFPB is a young organization, about eighteen months old. Its
design and implementation of its duties are still in progress. Because its
duties to handle complaints (unlike its rule-writing and enforcement
powers) did not require a Director, the CFPB could begin its work on
consumer complaints immediately. To date, the CFPB has tackled only a
portion of its complaint obligations. In this section, I describe the CFPB’s
actions thus far and evaluate them against its statutory duties.
The CFPB has taken a product-by-product approach to complaints. This
is consistent with consolidation of authority for consumer protection issues
in the CFPB, regardless of the prudential regulator of the company that
offered the product. Its website’s complaint page begins by asking the
consumer to identify the product at issue.36 Currently, the CFPB has a
mechanism for seven categories of consumer financial products: bank
accounts or service, credit cards, credit reporting, money transfers, home
loans, student loans, and vehicle or consumer loans.37
A. CREDIT CARDS AND MORTGAGES
On its opening day as a separate entity, July 21, 2011, the CFPB rolled
out a website that permitted consumers to submit complaints about their
credit cards.38 In December 2011, the CFPB began to handle complaints
about a second product—home mortgages. Neither site publishes a toll-free
phone number or a mailing address as alternate submission routes. The
former is particularly surprising in light of the specific statutory language
requiring a toll-free number for complaints.39 The site does offer a live
online chat with a representative for twelve hours each week day, although
this tool would not seem to address the problem of consumers who lack
web access or computer sophistication. To find the mailing address or
phone number, consumers have to go to another area of the site entirely,
35. The CFPB could take on additional duties with respect to complaints. Section 1013 states
that the functions “shall include” establishing centralized means for aggrieved consumers to
contact the CFPB and a database of complaints. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. 1367, 2008 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A) (2010)). That
language leaves open the possibility of additional kinds of activity with respect to complaints.
36. Consumer Questions and Complaints, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/get-help
-now/consumer-questions-and-complaints/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
37. Submit a Complaint, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/complaint/ (last visited Jan.
16, 2013).
38. File a Credit Card Complaint, CFPB, https://help.consumerfinance.gov/app/creditcard/ask
(last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
39. Dodd-Frank Act § 1013(b)(3)(A), 124 Stat. at 1969 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5493(b)(3)(A)).
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“Contact Us,” where a phone number and post office box are given.40
Perhaps partially as a result, 44 percent of complaints submitted directly to
the CFPB came via its website.41
The CFPB’s web form for credit cards asks consumers to “describe
what happened so we can understand the issue” and contains a large text
box.42 The consumer inputs a narrative. Below that, there is a long list of
credit card-related issues and the consumer is asked to mark the single
category that best describes their complaint.43 Those categories are
imprecise and imperfect. Some categories are very large, such as
“transaction issue.” Other categories seem to overlap; for example, there
would seem to be no obvious difference between “collection practices” and
“collection debt dispute.” The main use of such categories at this point may
be to develop a program to analyze the consumer’s own description of the
problem. The CFPB could use a natural language algorithm to try to
identify the nature of a complaint—without any human reading the
complaint. It could check the output of the algorithm against the
consumer’s self-identified category of the complaint and refine the
algorithm accordingly. To date, this idea is not deployed.
The CFPB site asks several other questions of complainants, including
the amount of the dispute, what techniques they tried before contacting the
CFPB, and if the consumer believes the company engaged in
discrimination. After submitting that information, the consumer is asked to
describe in her own words “What do you think would be a fair resolution to
your issue?” The form then gathers information about the consumer and the
product. Upon submission, the consumer is given a tracking number. The
consumer can check the status of their complaint by using a login created as
part of the submission process to revisit the web page.
The complaint intake for mortgages is substantially similar to the one
described above for credit cards. It is a web form, primarily consisting of
open-ended text boxes for the consumer to describe the problem and the
relief sought.44 The mortgage form has far fewer closed-ended categories
for the type of problem. It asks consumers to identify “which part of the
mortgage process is your issue related to” from five choices: applying for

40. Contact Us, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/contact-us/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2012). In its most recent semi-annual report, the CFPB emphasizes its call center, noting that it
handles calls with little or no wait time, is U.S.-based, and provides services in 187 languages and
for hearing- and speech-impaired consumers. CFPB, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 16 (2012) [hereinafter SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT], available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2012/01/Congressional_Report_Jan2012.pdf.
41. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 17.
42. File a Credit Card Complaint, CFPB, https://help.consumerfinance.gov/app/creditcard/ask
(last visited on Sept. 20, 2012).
43. Id.
44. File a Mortgage Complaint, CFPB, https://help.consumerfinance.gov/app/mortgage/ask
(last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
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the loan, receiving a credit offer, signing the agreement, making payments,
and problems when you are unable to pay.45 The mortgage categories do not
overlap, are broad in nature, and identify moments in a transaction rather
than a substantive legal issue. There seems to be a different strategy to
building a typology of mortgage complaints than credit card complaints. It
seems likely to me that the variation in categories in the credit card form
and mortgage form reflect different teams of people building complaint
systems for different products, rather than a coherent and thoughtful
strategy based on the products themselves.
B. RESPONSES TO COMPLAINTS
The CFPB does not review complaints in the first instance. Its website
describes the basic process. “We’ll forward your issue to your [credit
card/mortgage] company, give you a tracking number, and keep you
updated on the status of your complaint.”46 The benchmark for evaluating
this referral process is the statutory language requiring the CFPB to
“respond” to complaints. The adequacy of the CFPB’s “receive and refer”
approach will turn on how businesses deal with forwarded complaints and
the CFPB’s efforts to ensure that such responses are adequate.
The CFPB has a web portal to communicate to companies that a
complaint was made. The web portal permits companies to acknowledge
complaints and mark their status. The Company Portal Manual provides
detail about what businesses are to do with complaints to satisfy the
CFPB’s rules.47 Businesses have fifteen days to select one of four
responses: closed with relief, closed without relief, in progress, and alerted
CFPB. If the business does not select a response in fifteen days, the web
portal flags the complaint and prioritizes it for investigation by the CFPB
Consumer Response unit, a group of non-lawyer investigators.
The Company Portal Manual defines the four responses available to
businesses. Selecting “in progress” gives the business sixty days to close
the complaint, with or without relief.48 If the business fails to update the
status after sixty days, it is automatically changed to “No Response,” which
prioritizes it for investigation by Consumer Response.49 “Alerted CFPB” is
a category that tells the CFPB of a problem that limits the company’s ability
to respond, such as suspected fraud in making the complaint or that the
complaint is already the subject of pending legal action.50
45. Id.
46. File a Credit Card Complaint, CFPB, https://help.consumerfinance.gov/app/creditcard/ask
(last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
47. CFPB,
COMPANY
PORTAL
MANUAL
(Nov.
21,
2011)
[hereinafter COMPANY PORTAL MANUAL], available at http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/files
/2012/01/CFPBCompanyPortalManualv2.pdf.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id. at 12.
50. Id. at 13.
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If it categorizes a complaint as “closed,” the business is to provide
detail to support that it has given a “final responsive explanation to the
consumer.”51 The required information tracks the provisions of Dodd-Frank
section 1034, including communications from the consumer and follow-up
actions or planned follow-up actions.52 The business is to “attach copies of
all responsive written communications to the consumer.”53 The Manual
states that “relief” is defined by the CFPB as “objective, measurable, and
verifiable monetary value to the consumer as a direct result of the steps you
have taken or will take in response to the complaint. If relief has been or
will be provided, describe the relief and enter the dollar amount of that
relief.”54 From my research, I conclude that this is the most robust
formulation of relief for consumer complaints in use by the federal
government. The definition is not the law, because it is not a rule made after
notice and comment pursuant to the CFPB’s statutory powers. Industry may
contest the definition in favor of a different, lesser standard in the future. Or
future CFPB leadership may relax the standard.
The CFPB definition of relief has some other limitations. First, the
requirement of monetary relief seems to evince a belief that banks should
spend money to help consumers. But some complaints may not be for
monetary harms. Consider complaints based on rude behavior by a
customer service representative or having to resubmit lost paperwork. There
arguably was no monetary harm in such instances. Other complaints may
reflect harms that are difficult to monetize. A consumer who experiences
lending discrimination or debt collection abuses has suffered real harm, and
money damages are available if the consumer filed and won a private
lawsuit. Without a jury to determine damages, however, it is unclear what
the appropriate dollar amount a consumer should receive without either
under- or overcompensation.
The requirement that the relief be objective and measurable may also
undermine some kinds of relief that consumers actually find meaningful. In
other legal contexts, such as criminal law and medical malpractice, there is
a rich literature on the value of apology.55 Apologies can be highly valuable
in making a consumer feel that a wrong was righted. Yet, a letter admitting
an error and apologizing would not seem to satisfy the CFPB definition.
The emphasis in the CFPB’s Manual seems to be on enabling it to
count, view, and report on the outcome to the consumer. Like prior
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 10, 11.
See id. at 1–2.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 10.
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology
into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal
Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003); Charles Vincent et al.,
Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 THE
LANCET 1609 (1994).
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regulators, the CFPB also surveys consumers after the complaint procedure
is complete to measure their satisfaction. But the CFPB surely will not rely
only on such data to evaluate whether the relief was sufficient. The effect is
to require the business to satisfy both the consumer—so that she makes a
favorable report on the outcome of the complaint to the CFPB—and the
CFPB itself, which could use the data on the relief given to create a
benchmark on whether the relief was sufficient.
C. COMPLAINT DATA
The CFPB is required by statute to provide an annual report to
Congress on its complaint operations every March 31.56 The first such
report was released in 2012.57 The CFPB also must provide semi-annual
reports that cover a range of topics, including “an analysis of complaints
about consumer financial products or services that the Bureau has received
and collected in its central database on complaints during the preceding
year.”58 These publications will allow policymakers, industry, advocates,
and, of course, the public to assess the CFPB’s complaint mechanism. It is
not only the CFPB that is to “track” and “monitor” complaints. Instead, as
part of that duty, the CFPB is to facilitate the ability of other entities to
evaluate its work in handling complaints.
The CFPB’s final policy statement describes the circumstances under
which the CFPB will disclose credit card complaint data.59 The statement is
clear that the CFPB will not disclose any information from complaints that
would be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. Consumers’
personally identifiable information, including names, will not be revealed.60
The CFPB will not disclose to the public a consumers’ or companies’
narrative responses because they may contain confidential consumer
information or material protected from disclosure under law.61
The CFPB will withhold the narrative data because of privacy
concerns.62 While this seems sensible, it creates a marked consequence for
the CFPB’s approach of relying nearly exclusively on narratives to gather
the complaint data. If the CFPB were to ask more closed-ended questions,
more complaint data would be available for disclosure and analysis. This
creates considerable pressure on the CFPB to ask the “right” questions in its
complaint form to permit identification of the nature of consumers’
grievances.
56. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1013(b)(3)(C), 124 Stat. 1376, 1969 (2010)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5493 (2010)).
57. CFPB, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT 4 n.3 (2012).
58. Dodd-Frank Act § 1016, 124 Stat. at 1974–75 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5496(c)(4)).
59. Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,558 (June 22, 2012),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-06-22/pdf/2012-15163.pdf.
60. Id. at 37,569 (Policy Statement § 2(e)).
61. Id. at 37,568 (Policy Statement § 2(e)).
62. Id. at 37,568 (Policy Statement § 1).
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The CFPB will disclose non-narrative data from complaints.63 The data
will be available in fully searchable and downloadable format.64 The data
will also be used in CFPB reports.65 The CFPB’s policy statement provides
that a complaint will be added to the public database within fifteen days of
receipt, in most instances, and other information about the complaint will be
updated daily.66 It also states that the CFPB will publish complaint reports
“at periodic intervals.”67 However, these terms are subject to interpretation
and could vary over time. The intent of disclosure is to “improve the
transparency and efficiency of the credit card market,”68 which would seem
to require relatively rapid disclosure—measured in months, not years—of
the complaint data.
While it notes that the reliability of such data are disputed because
complainants are certainly a nonrandom subset of all users of a financial
product, the CFPB anticipates that disclosed complaint data’s primary use
would be study “for trends and patterns” by “academics and groups
dedicated to empowering consumers in making well-informed decisions.”69
It minimizes the potential use of such data by industry, stating in a footnote
to the preceding quoted sentence that “[i]n addition, issuers would likely
mine the data and might publicize to consumers how their complaint
performance measures up against competitors.”70 If the data reflect better
performance by some actors, then marketing on that basis would enhance
the marketplace for financial products. The CFPB notes, however, that
complaint rates and resolutions may vary for reasons other than provider
quality.71 For example, more complex products may result in more
complaints, and some providers may specialize in such products. Or,
businesses with effective internal complaint procedures may have fewer
consumers that reach out to the CFPB. The CFPB’s thoughtful analysis of
these problems suggests that it will be sensitive to such issues in using
complaint data for purposes such as rule-writing and consumer education.
III. ASSESSING THE CFPB’S COMPLAINT MECHANISM
In its first-ever semi-annual report, the CFPB provided data on the
complaints received and their dispositions. These data, along with the rules
and statutes discussed above, permit a tentative assessment of the CFPB’s
likely effectiveness with regard to its complaint resolution function.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 37,568–69 (Policy Statement § 2(b)).
Id. at 37,569 (Policy Statement § 2(d)).
Id. (Policy Statement § 3).
Id. (Policy Statement § 2(c)).
Id. at 37568 (Policy Statement § 3).
Id. at 37,567 (Policy Statement § 1).
Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg. 76,628, at 76,630 (Dec. 8,

2011).
70. Id. at 76,630 n.9.
71. Id. at 76,630.
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A. CONSUMERS’ COMPLAINTS
In the roughly six-month period beginning July 2011, the CFPB
received 13,210 consumer complaints.72 Most of these (9,307) pertained to
credit cards.73 This is not surprising given that the CFPB took credit card
complaints for the entire period. In only one month, December 2011, CFPB
received 2,326 mortgage complaints.74 It is impossible to evaluate the
CFPB’s success in attracting complaints without comparable data on how
many complaints were received collectively by the prudential regulators in
the preceding periods. The economy is also a factor. The slowdown or halt
in foreclosures may have limited the impetus for consumers to complain
about mortgage problems. On the other hand, tight standards for
underwriting may increase complaints about applying for or obtaining
credit. Similarly, legal changes will affect complaint volume. The Credit
Card Act of 200975 may have eliminated many practices that were most
likely to aggrieve consumers, reducing complaints for that product.
These concerns reveal that the raw numbers of complaints have little
meaning on their own. Their best use may be to chart trends over time. If
the CFPB enacts new rules and complaints continue to trend upward, the
rules may have missed the mark or may not be translating into relief on the
ground for consumers. Similarly, a spike in complaints that consumers
categorize as being “other” in nature could reflect the development of a new
industry practice that is troubling to consumers. The larger issue is that the
CFPB’s entire purpose is to reduce complaints from consumers about
financial products and services. If its rulemaking initiatives are successful,
fewer complaints will be filed. However, fewer complaints could also
evidence poor effort by the CFPB to promote its complaint mechanism or
weak enforcement of its complaint duties.
The CFPB report gives detail on the complaints filed using the
categories on the web input form.76 For credit cards, 69.5 percent of
complaints were in one of ten categories. The most popular category was
“billing disputes,” which is broad enough to capture a wide swath of
problems, including those with their own category such as late fees, APR or
interest rates, or collection disputes. Tellingly, the third most popular
category of complaints is “other,” capturing 9.2 percent of consumer
input.77 This is particularly noteworthy given that this appears at the bottom
of the list of categories on the CFPB’s web form and requires consumers to
take the additional step of describing the “other” in their own words. These
72.
73.
74.
75.

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 17.
Id.
Id.
Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (Credit Card Act of
2009), Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
76. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 17.
77. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 17.
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categories of data seem to have little value for rulemaking, legislative
advocacy, or enforcement. The responses are too diffuse, the categories are
too broad, and the reliance on consumer interpretation is too great.
As described above, the mortgage categories focus on points in the
process rather than substantive violations. Although there are fewer
categories and they seem more distinct, consumers still chose “other” in
23.2 percent of instances.78 The most popular categories—unsurprisingly
given the economy—related to “problems when you are unable to pay” at
38.2 percent and “making payments” at 21.5 percent.79 Without
subcategories, it is impossible to discern whether consumers were
complaining about legal violations, such as a misapplied payment or an
abuse of the foreclosure process, or were writing to the CFPB because they
wanted a loan modification in the form of a principal write-down or
refinance. The former is squarely in the purview of the CFPB’s core duties
to protect consumers, while the latter raises larger issues about economic
policy that concern the Treasury, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and
Housing and Urban Development. At least in their first iteration, the
mortgage data, like the credit card data, offer only a weak foundation for
understanding the level of consumer protection.
B. COMPANIES’ RESPONSES
A firmer basis for evaluating the design of the CFPB’s complaint
mechanism is the response data. The CFPB reports that in its first six
months, 75 percent of all complaints were sent to companies for review and
action.80 This may seem impressive. The referral process is highly
automated, however, so that forwarding complaints would seem to be an
easy task.
The CFPB is transparent about the disposition of the quarter of
complaints that do not reach companies. About 11 percent of them were
referred to other regulatory agencies.81 It will be instructive to see if this
fraction drops as the CFPB enables its complaint capacity for the complete
array of financial products and services. Consumers fail to make complete
complaints in 5.4 percent of instances.82 This percentage is odd, given that
the web form requires the consumer to complete a certain amount of
information to even be able to submit a complaint. The CFPB may be able
to reduce incomplete complaints if it analyzes what aspects of the form give
consumers the most difficulty and redesigns them accordingly. Pending
responses account for the other 8.9 percent of complaints, with that fraction

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19 n.15.
Id.
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split about evenly between consumers and the CFPB as to which party has
responsibility to take the next action.83
The key to evaluating the CFPB’s complaint system is data on how
companies respond to complaints. The early data are moderately
encouraging. The CFPB reports that companies have responded to 88.1
percent of the complaints sent to them.84 Over half (55 percent) of all
complaints sent to businesses were “closed with relief provided” to
consumers.85 Approximately 31 percent of complaints were closed without
relief.86 The remaining portion remained with the company for review.87
There will always be some complaints pending, given that submission is a
rolling process and companies have between fifteen and sixty days to
respond as described above.88 The portal for companies and the timeline for
responses are working as transmission channels to funnel complaints from
the CFPB to businesses. Upon receipt, businesses are processing those
complaints rather than letting them linger. These are positive notes.
The current data reveal little about the nature of relief provided to
consumers and why no relief was provided in some instances. The CFPB
uses the term “consumer review” to describe its process for asking
consumers whether the business’s response was adequate. Consumers had
not responded to almost half (47.5 percent) of the CFPB’s requests for
feedback on the company’s resolution.89 This may reflect that the complaint
process is in its infancy; consumers often may let these e-mails or letters
linger before giving the CFPB feedback on the business’s response.
Alternatively, and probably more likely, the low rate of response to the
CFPB could reflect a serious weakness in the design of the complaint
mechanism. Consumers may simply not see any value in responding to the
CFPB, but that could stem from two very different reasons: (1) because
consumers are satisfied with the resolution, or (2) because consumers are
unsatisfied with the resolution. In either case, consumers may think it a
waste of time to respond to the CFPB. The crux of the problem is that we
cannot know the relative size of either of these groups. Those who do not
respond to the CFPB’s request for feedback may not be the same population
as those who do respond. This makes it difficult to have confidence in the
data from the half of consumers who did respond. Analysis by the CFPB
could ameliorate this concern to some degree.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Because mortgage complaints had only been taken for month or two at the time of the
report, it is not surprising that 30.3 percent of those complaints were still under review at
companies, compared with only 6.7 percent of credit card complaints. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 40, at 19.
89. Id. at 20.
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To the extent the feedback data are valid, their interpretation is
complicated. In 12.9 percent of cases, consumers provided feedback to the
CFPB that they “disputed [the] company’s reported resolution.”90
Consumers who “did not dispute the company’s reported resolution” were
39.6 percent of all closed cases.91 These consumers accepted the company’s
response as valid—regardless of whether the business provided them with
relief.92 One is tempted to interpret these categories as “failure” and
“success” rates, respectively. Certainly, they represent the “worst” and
“best” outcomes in the CFPB’s current taxonomy for resolution status.
However, consumers may accept a company’s response even if that
response is unfair or incomplete.93 They may believe that if their complaint
did not generate relief or only generated relief of a given amount, that such
an outcome is the best possible outcome. In their mindset, if the CFPB
could only help them get “X,” then “X” is the relief that their complaint
merited. This is almost certainly true in many instances, but the data as
currently disclosed do not permit an evaluation of the actual relief offered.
Conversely, consumers may dispute a company’s resolution of their
complaint even if the company acted in compliance with the law or was
even generous in its resolution. Some consumers will request impossible or
ridiculous relief, just as others will cave for a modicum of accommodation
or help. Without a substantive audit of the nature of the complaint and the
relief provided, it is difficult to know whether to accept consumers’
evaluations at face value. They provide only a self-reported measure of
consumer satisfaction, not an actual assessment of consumer protection.
Another fatal flaw in the CFPB’s report is that it does not permit a
determination of the overlap in categories to determine the percentage of
those who received relief and did not dispute that relief. The statistics
simply do not provide enough transparency to understand how the CFPB’s
complaint mechanism is faring in its early efforts. The danger, of course, is
that the CFPB builds out its entire capacity without a more careful
examination of its efforts to date.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id
Id.
Id.
Cf. Paul Lubin, Stop Assuming Your Good Customer Satisfaction Scores Indicate Fairness,
AM. BANKER (Dec. 27, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/stop
-assuming-your-good-customer-satisfaction-scores-indicate-fairness-1055459-1.html (“This is
because consumers are not always able to accurately judge whether or not their needs are met
based on the information they are provided. They are especially vulnerable when information is
insufficient or faulty, when products are complex and when access to service and products is
limited.”).
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IV. THE GOVERNMENT’S CONSUMER: PURPOSES OF
COMPLAINT MECHANISMS
A lack of necessary data is not the only barrier to evaluating the
CFPB’s complaint system. A more fundamental problem is a lack of
consensus about the purpose of the government acting on behalf of
consumers aggrieved with nongovernment actors. Without a clear
exposition of the goals of a complaint mechanism, its evaluation is fraught
with difficulties. Parties may dispute its success because they are using
different metrics, and the complaint mechanism could be manipulated to
serve varying purposes over time. Using the CFPB as an illustrative
example, this section develops arguments for why the government should
address complaints and assesses the reasonableness of such expectations. It
exposes the weak theoretical framework for government complaint handling
that makes it challenging to evaluate the CFPB’s work on complaints.
A. EXPRESSIVE DEMOCRATIC RIGHT (CF. VOTING)
A simple point to begin the discussion is that the complaints at issue are
not grievances with the government. The counterparty to the consumer’s
complaint is a private actor. This contrasts with situations in which the
government is being asked to change its own actions, such as a denial of
government benefits or to provide recompense for a tort committed by a
government actor. The CFPB’s complaint mechanism puts the government
in a mediating role between private actors with a dispute. America has an
entire branch of government—the courts—that performs just this function
(although, of course, courts also decide matters between government and
private citizens). The complaints directed to administrative agencies are
sometimes precursors to lawsuits, but that is not required. The CFPB and
most government agencies are not clearinghouses for litigation; there is no
administrative exhaustion requirement to file an action for any violation of
federal or state consumer law. When it takes complaints from individuals
about businesses, the government is not performing an adjudicative
function.
A crisp purpose for the government as complaint handler is largely
unarticulated. One expression, in a general form, seems to be that such a
role is an outgrowth of democracy. The right to complain to the government
about private parties—and to expect the government to be responsive in
return—is a way for the government to serve the people. In this way, it
supplements core citizen rights such as voting, filing suit against the
government in court, or exercising free speech rights.
In the consumer rights context, this concept dates back at least to
President John F. Kennedy. The 1962 Consumer Bill of Rights included the
right to “be assured that consumer interests will receive full and
sympathetic consideration in the formulation of Government policy, and
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fair and expeditious treatment in its administrative tribunals.”94 The first
part of this right could be completely satisfied without the government
responding to complaints. It is instead an expressive right. The government
collecting and monitoring complaints, and using them in policy, would
satisfy this goal even if it never pursued any redress for consumers.
Complaint mechanisms improve democracy by providing a conduit for
consumers to express their problems and desired solutions.
President Richard Nixon’s articulation of the consumer rights concept
expanded the idea to suggest redress. He added to the Consumer Bill of
Rights the consumer’s right “to register his dissatisfaction, and have his
complaint heard and weighed, when his interests are badly served.”95 This
gives the government at least some responsibility to determine if the
consumer’s complain has merit. The reference to a consumer’s “interests”
in President Nixon’s statements is ambiguous. Are those the interests that
an individual has as a private party—a consumer? Or are the interests those
of an individual as a partner in a civic relationship—as a citizen—when the
government does not perform its functions in ways that respect the position
of consumers?
One way of analyzing this ambiguity is asking whether the government
is creating a customer relationship when it collects and responds to
complaints. The foundations of democracy clearly rest on consumers as
vital actors in a political marketplace of sorts, but the analogy can be
stretched too far. The government is not selling something, and, at least
without a lengthy and majoritarian process, its leadership cannot change.
Nor can it go out of business in the conventional sense because consumers
are dissatisfied. Lest this concept of complaining citizens as the
government’s customers seems far-fetched, I note that the Federal
Reserve’s website speaks of contacting a “Federal Reserve customer service
representative.”96 Citizens may feel a stronger connection to the
government when they think of themselves as its customers. The creation of
vibrant forums for public complaining and satisfying aggrieved consumers
may increase confidence in government. It provides a positive point of
contact between the administrative branch and citizens and increases
consumers’ belief in the government as a positive force in society.
This discussion suggests that one purpose for government handling
complaints in modern America is to demonstrate to citizens on an
individual level that the government hears their concerns and will work on
their behalf to pursue redress from industry. Note that the CFPB, like most
94. SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON PROTECTING THE CONSUMER INTEREST, 1962
PUB. PAPERS 235, 236.
95. SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, 1969 PUB. PAPERS
883, 883.
96. Consumer Help, FED. RES., http://www.federalreserveconsumerhelp.gov (last visited Mar.
28, 2012).
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administrative government entities with complaint mechanisms, does not
take complaints between industry actors.97 The government interferes only
when a business has aggrieved a consumer, and upon the consumer’s
request.
B. LITIGATION SUBSTITUTE (CF. PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION IN
STATUTES)
The fact that complaint mechanisms concern themselves only with
consumer-business relationships reveals another purpose for the
government handling complaints: such mechanisms are a remedial tool to
make up for shortcomings in the courts. The administrative branch of the
government takes complaints because the judicial branch is not effective at
providing redress for consumers wronged by businesses. In this conception,
the existence of a complaint mechanism in any given area is a marker of the
failure of litigation. This “alternate dispute resolution” reason for
complaints is a service to citizens that is distinct from the government’s
duty to hear consumer concerns and reflect them in lawmaking discussed in
the preceding section. The latter is largely legislative in nature, while the
former is adjudicative. The administrative branch could well be performing
either or both functions when it handles consumer complaints, but
distinguishing these goals provides analytical clarity.
The focus on obtaining relief for consumers is consistent with
government complaint mechanisms as alternatives to filing suit in court. In
the financial services area, Congress may have mandated “appropriate
action” and “responses” to complaints because consumers were, and are,
not able to bring successful actions in court to police consumer protection
rules. Multiple factors hinder consumers in pursuing the private rights of
action in consumer laws, including difficulty in affording lawyers or
proceeding pro se, a lack of awareness that a legal violation has occurred
(as opposed to a mere feeling of being wronged), and insufficient or
inefficient remedies that undercompensate or take too long. This is not the
place to expound upon those concerns, despite their legitimacy. The
relevant point concerns how to evaluate complaint mechanisms. To the
extent that such units function as substitutes for the courts, that role
suggests comparison with private right of action outcomes as a standard for
measuring the government’s efficacy in handling complaints. Congress has
expressed support for this understanding of complaint mechanisms by
stating an expectation that regulatory agencies “conduct independent

97. One exception to this idea is the Federal Trade Commission’s Antitrust division.
Businesses can be complaining parties asserting unfair trade practices by a competitor.
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investigations of the complaint,” rather than merely asking the business “to
look into the situation.”98
One criticism of a framework for complaints as alternatives to litigation
is that complaints are, by definition, not limited to problems that are
violations of the law. The CFPB defines complaints in a way that
recognizes lesser claims. “Consumer complaints are submissions that
express dissatisfaction with, or communicate suspicion of wrongful conduct
by, an identifiable entity related to a consumer’s personal experience with a
financial product or service.”99 This standard not only includes both
possible and probable legal violations, but also vague expressions of being
wronged. Dissatisfied consumers can be widespread in lawful industries;
indeed, financial services may be a poster child for such an industry. For
example, most of the mortgage lending practices that were decried during
the foreclosure crisis were lawful when they occurred, and many remain
lawful today. Yet, millions of consumers are dissatisfied with their home
loans and appeal to the government for help in changing their mortgage
obligations. These are complaints that the CFPB collects, monitors, and
tracks, even though it knows that consumers do not have the legal right to
demand a loan modification.
Government complaint mechanisms may siphon some claims away
from courts and provide an alternative route to redress for legal violations.
Lawsuits are clearly a subset of all complaints, however, suggesting that
litigation outcomes as a benchmark for evaluating complaint mechanisms is
only partially correct. Moreover, if complaints are a substitute for litigation,
we would expect two additional features in such mechanisms. First, a
requirement of administrative exhaustion before filing suit would help sort
the most appropriate cases into courts and agencies’ complaint systems. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requirement arguably serves
such a purpose.100 The CFPB, like most complaint systems, does not have
such a rule. Consumers who are suing are not proper complainants,101 but
one can sue without having ever complained. Second, if complaint systems
replace litigation, then in at least some instances the agency should litigate
on behalf of consumers. Agencies usually sue, however, to obtain
widespread relief and change practices on a going-forward basis. The
98. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at iii (Letter of Transmittal from Frank Annusio to Henry S.
Reuss) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 17 n.13.
100. Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Improper Dismissal of Title VII Claims on “Jurisdictional”
Exhaustion Grounds: How Federal Courts Require That Allegations be Presented to an Agency
Without the Resources to Consider Them, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 213, 219 (2011)
(“Exhaustion allows agencies the first chance ‘to resolve issues over which [they have] primary
responsibility.’” (quoting 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8397 (1st ed. 1982))).
101. COMPANY PORTAL MANUAL, supra note 47, at 8–13 (describing how businesses should
alert the CFPB if a complaint is already the subject of legal action by the consumer).

2012]

The Complaint Conundrum

79

litigation may take too long to help a particular consumer or may be
brought against a particular business for strategic reasons rather than against
the business that aggrieved any given consumer.
C. KNOWLEDGE BASIS FOR LAWMAKING (CF. NOTICE AND
COMMENT RULEMAKING)
Complaints may provide knowledge to government agencies that aids
them in their traditional administrative law duties. Complaints can help
identify targets for enforcement, alert the government to new practices and
products, and reveal perceptions about the marketplace. Such knowledge is
useful both for enforcement and for rulemaking. In this conception,
complaint mechanisms are an adjunct to agencies’ research units. They
provide useful data, albeit of a nonrandom type. The repository of consumer
complaints, including businesses’ response to them and consumers’
satisfaction levels with those responses, gives the government information
on the perceptions of consumers and businesses about fairness in a
marketplace. The knowledge value of complaints has been recognized for
decades. One of the only law review articles on complaint systems,
published in 1979, observed that “[a]n ideal system would improve the
quality of goods and services by alerting producers about defects and by
providing administrative agencies with data to guide and support
enforcement.”102 This knowledge function for complaints can be analogized
to the perspectives provided by a robust system of public notice-andcomment rulemaking that generates insights on the marketplace and its
actors’ concerns.
The use of complaints to generate enforcement targets is related to their
use to address weaknesses in litigation. Because public enforcement serves
different goals than private enforcement,103 the usefulness of complaints for
these purposes may be different. Effective public enforcement activity
requires a deep knowledge of the marketplace. To design a successful
strategy for rulemaking, the agency must know if the violations are
widespread or concentrated among a few actors, the extent of damages in
the typical and the most egregious cases, and how the practice at issue fits
into companies’ larger businesses. Complaints can provide such
information, and this is the likely reason for requiring the CFPB to create a
database of complaints.
The government cannot rely blindly on a complaint repository for
choosing its enforcement targets. Complaints to the government are almost
102. Nader, supra note 25, at 1007.
103. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public
Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1155 (2012) (“Private enforcement provides, in many
respects, a direct response to the functional limitations of public regulatory bodies in the
enforcement of various laws.”); see also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of
Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
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certain to be more likely for certain kinds of violations and to be made by
certain kinds of people. Marketing scholars have examined the propensity
to complain and the choices people make to be passive or active after
experiencing product dissatisfaction.104 Consumers who are less connected
to the government because of age, immigration status, race, religion, or
other demographic qualities may be significantly less likely to complain.
This means that companies and products targeting certain populations may
not be complained about in numbers or ways that attract attention. To take
one example applicable to the CFPB, service members may refrain from
complaining about financial problems because debt problems can be a
violation of military honor codes or grounds for loss of security clearance.
The law requiring the CFPB to have an Office of Service Members Affairs
presumably reflects congressional recognition that this is a population in
need of additional attention, including enforcement.105
The use of complaint data for enforcement was criticized during
reforms of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, or the Commission). One
study found that more than two-thirds of the investigations begun by the
Commission arose from complaints received in the mail, a reliance on
outside complaints that it characterized as excessive.106 Former
Commissioner Elman offered that study as a “measure of the Commission’s
failure to follow a responsible system of priorities” in developing
investigations based on the Commission’s own work rather than relying on
“random ‘applications for complaint’ received from the public at large.”107
Using the limited data from the CFPB as an example of the possibility for
misdirection, the number of people seeking mortgage modifications surely
says more about housing prices and the consumer protection problems of
the past than it does about the optimal deployment of resources in forwardlooking enforcement.
Relying on complaints to gauge enforcement needs could lead to
substantial underenforcement or inactivity. Just as lack of awareness of
their legal rights is a hindrance to litigation, so too does it limit consumers’
belief that their experiences form the basis of valid complaints. Legal
knowledge is a prerequisite to successful enforcement activity, and
consumers often do not know the law. On a more fundamental level, they
may not even be complaining about a practice or product. Instead, the
consumer may be complaining about poor customer service, such as long
wait times in bank branches, or complex disclosures that are legally
104. See, e.g., William O. Bearden & Richard L. Oliver, The Role of Public and Private
Complaining in Satisfaction with Problem Resolution, 19 J. CONS. AFFAIRS 222 (1985).
105. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1013(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1972 (2010) (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 5493(e) (2010)).
106. Carl A. Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure,
48 MINN. L. REV. 383, 393–94 (1964).
107. Philip Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEO. L.J. 777,
797 (1971).
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mandated. In its early years, the Federal Reserve Board concluded that
often its review “indicates that no regulation or law has been violated, but
rather that communications between the bank and the consumer have
broken down.”108 Those problems may reveal a dysfunctional marketplace
for financial products, but enforcement would be an unusual solution to
such concerns.
The CFPB could issue rules to deal with communication problems that
generate complaints. Confusing disclosures may not be legal violations, but
consumers’ concerns about them could guide a redesign of those forms.
Complaints could reveal harms of new products that are not subject to
existing rules. Consumer groups that supported the CFPB were optimistic
about this potential. “The agency also should be required to conduct realtime analysis of consumer complaints regarding patterns and practices in
the credit and payment systems industries and to apply these analyses when
writing rules and enforcing rules and laws.”109 At its best, complaint
handling could offer valuable insights into industry to guide rulemaking.
There are countervailing concerns. First, industry knowledge might be
gleaned in a less expensive and more comprehensive way than from
handling complaints. Examination powers give the CFPB access to detailed
data on business practices, and even simple tools like mystery shoppers
could yield insights on problematic practices. Second, complaints are
necessarily subjective. They may provide guidance for rulemaking, but of a
noisy and unreliable sort. Well-written rules should improve the
marketplace overall. They should reflect a balance of competing concerns
between consumers and industry, not placate a minority of consumers. The
purpose for rules is not merely to make consumers more satisfied.
Comments submitted in response to proposed rules are also subjective,
reflecting the perspective of their authors. But they are made available to all
for scrutiny, and agencies must explain why they did or did not take
account of their concerns. Even if complaint data are disclosed in various
ways, the use of complaints to guide rulemaking is less transparent than the
notice and comment process. The CFPB has recognized this issue, without
mentioning complaints specifically. It has a policy of summarizing and
publishing what it terms “ex parte presentations”—telephone calls, emails,
and letters that it receives during a notice and comment process that pertain
to a rule but are not submitted via official channels.110
108. Oversight on Consumer Protection Activities of Federal Banking Agencies: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 256 (1976) (responses to
questions in letter of July 9, 1976 from Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors, Fed.
Reserve Sys.).
109. Hearing, supra note 19, at 99 (statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Dir., Consumer
Fed’n of Am.).
110. CFPB, CFPB BULLETIN 11-3, POLICY ON EX PARTE PRESENTATIONS IN RULEMAKING
PROCEEDINGS (Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011
/08/Bulletin_20110819_ExPartePresentationsRulemakingProceedings.pdf.
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Government complaint mechanisms for consumers are relatively
undeveloped terrain. That fact has policy consequences. The CFPB faces
choices in designing and implementing its complaint mechanism that may
prioritize one of the identified purposes over another. Perhaps the best
course forward is for the CFPB to be clear about its own aspirations for its
complaint system. Within the limits of its statutory mandate to “collect,
monitor, and respond” to complaints, the CFPB could delineate the ways in
which complaints will bear on its other duties. A crisp and transparent
articulation of its goals would, at minimum, advance debate about what the
CFPB should accomplish with its complaint system.
V. THE PARADOX OF COMPLAINTS FOR CONSUMER
PROTECTION
The law mandates that the CFPB will have a complaint mechanism for
the foreseeable future. The unanswered question is whether that complaint
system will improve the overall consumer protection framework. This final
section identifies a paradox. The CFPB’s willingness to help consumers
with complaints may retard some of its other efforts. In the end, the CFPB’s
complaint mechanism may not improve the equilibrium level of consumer
protection. Considering such a possibility points to pitfalls for the CFPB to
avoid as it builds out its complaint system.
I begin with a brief review of the benefits of the CFPB handling
complaints about financial products and services, taking into account its
statutory duties and the possible purposes of government complaint
mechanisms. On the most obvious level, some consumers will get relief
because the CFPB forwards their complaints that they would not receive if
they had contacted the business themselves. Fundamentally, businesses will
reverse decisions and pay restitution to consumers who are aggrieved
because those businesses do not want to be targets for CFPB rulemaking or
enforcement. The early data show that the CFPB clearly will receive tens of
thousands of complaints each year. Aiding a fraction of those complainants
in obtaining monetary relief is a notable achievement.
The CFPB has made remarkable efforts to be visible to consumers. It
has deployed new technologies to reach consumers and keep them up to
date on the CFPB’s activities, including the availability of its complaint
system. Taking complaints is a tangible way that the CFPB shows
consumers that it is a “cop on the beat” of consumer protection.111 The
dissemination of complaint data also allows the public to count in a
measurable way the benefits of the CFPB to consumers. The responses
111. See
Elizabeth
Warren,
Letter
from
Elizabeth
Warren,
in
BUILDING THE CFPB, A PROGRESS REPORT 5 (2011), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/2011/07
/Report_BuildingTheCfpb1.pdf (“[The CFPB] will be a cop on the beat to enforce the laws on
credit cards, mortgages, student loans, prepaid cards, and other kinds of financial products and
services.”).

2012]

The Complaint Conundrum

83

from industry and consumers’ satisfaction with those responses show
citizens that the CFPB is not a victim of regulatory capture. The database,
particularly over time, can provide a baseline level of consumer protection
and can disseminate data to academics and advocates for research.
The biggest weakness in the CFPB’s complaint framework is that it will
always fall well short of its goals. This problem is not entirely the CFPB’s
fault. Most complaint systems seem to struggle.112 Congress has handed the
CFPB a near impossible task in asking it to respond to every consumer
complaint. In its early years, the FTC enjoyed protection from such an
obligation. “It was never the intention of Congress that the Commission
should be a forum where private disputes . . . should be settled, and the
Commission is required to find that a proceeding is in the public interest in
order to retain jurisdiction of it.”113 The CFPB was built, however, with
years of frustration with the way in which the financial regulators handled
consumer complaints in mind. The CFPB needs to do better than those
entities or its complaint mechanism will be judged a failure.
The CFPB has upped the stakes for its complaint system by adopting a
robust definition of relief. It seems almost certain that the majority of
consumers will not get relief under the CFPB’s definition. The early CFPB
data suggest that only a fraction of consumers get relief and are satisfied
with that relief. More depressingly, data from the other regulators suggest
more dismal prospects once the CFPB begins handling more types of
complaints and has higher volume. In 1967, the FTC closed more than half
of its cases “without any action at all being taken—no complaint issued, no
assurance of voluntary compliance taken.”114 A study of the financial
agencies in 1976 found that only 31 percent of consumers were satisfied
with agency resolution of their problem.115 Nearly half (49 percent) rated
the agency’s overall handling of their complaint as poor.116 A study of both
private and public complaint systems found that a “pervasive pattern of
unsatisfied complaints and inadequate relief emerges from research on
extrajudicial complaint settings.”117
112.
Instead of providing easy access to swift relief, many of the programs obstruct the
complainants’ path with complex procedures and repeated delays. . . . Intermediary
organizations are often understaffed, underfinanced, and overworked, and the resulting
backlogs and inefficiency can discourage consumers from pressing their complaints. . . .
In sum, complaint-processing methods often make it so difficult for complainants to
persist that they are likely to ‘lump it’ and even likely to avoid raising claims in the
future.
Nader, supra note 25, at 1006.
113. S. REP. NO. 74-1705, at 2 (1936).
114. Elman, supra note 107, at 797.
115. STAFF REPORT, supra note 29, at 5.
116. Id.
117. Nader, supra note 25, at 1000.

84

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 7

The CFPB may do better than its predecessors or other government
entities. To do so, however, it will almost certainly have to expend greater
resources than other agencies. It will be expensive to follow up on
complaints when industry does not give relief. Even auditing complaints
that result in relief to assess their adequacy will have significant costs. Over
time, if the CFPB realizes that its complaint system has high costs relative
to its benefits, it may weaken the system so that it does not help the same
number of consumers or demand that businesses provide relief. The FTC
apparently struggled to maintain appearances for its complaint mechanism,
which eroded significantly over time.118
The CFPB may achieve better effects for consumers through its other
activities, such as public enforcement, rulemaking, or education. To the
extent that complaint data provide information for those other activities, the
same or more reliable knowledge may be obtained at lower costs through
different means, such as direct surveys of consumers or targeted research
studies. There may be an inherent tension between the CFPB’s duties that
help all citizens and its duties to handle particular complaints.
A former Commissioner has chastised the FTC for too much orientation
to complaints at the expense of its other duties.
Commission members should concern themselves more with general
problems and broad solutions, and less with individual cases and narrow
adjudications. Agencies were created not to decide issues like “Did X
Company do these particular acts charged against it?” but rather to
consider questions such as “Is it unfair and anticompetitive for companies
in this industry to engage in this kind of practice?” The more the
Commission immerses itself in the former type of question, the less able it
is to deal with the latter.119

The FTC’s rules also highlight how complaint mechanisms straddle
responsiveness to individuals and a primary mission of achieving an overall
effect in the marketplace. Chapter 1, section .3.3 of the FTC Operating
Manual says that “[a]n investigation of an individual, business entity or
industry may be started as a result of public complaints, reports, or studies
by staff.”120 Yet this ideal of consumer as client has been eroded by other
rules. Past provisions clarified that complainants are not parties “in the
strict sense” and do not have “legal status.”121 “The FTC does not resolve

118. “It should be obvious why any number of investigations are closed without any
administrative action taken, simply on the ground of age and staleness. Usually no letter closing
the matter is sent to the proposed respondent because of the embarrassment that it would cause the
Commission.” Elman, supra note 107, at 799.
119. Id. at 826.
120. FTC, OPERATING MANUAL ch. 1, § .3.3 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/foia
/ch01overview.pdf.
121. 16 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1946).
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individual consumer complaints.”122 These are long-standing FTC policies
that have endured multiple administrative reforms.
The tension between complaints and other activities is likely to face the
CFPB on an ongoing basis. Ultimately, the solution may be for the CFPB to
engage in strategic planning that identifies the purpose of its complaint
mechanism. It should develop policies and procedures that spell out when
and how complaints will guide its other duties. This kind of clarity would
help the CFPB achieve its democratic purpose for complaint handling as
well. Consumers, and their advocates, would know the CFPB’s
expectations for its complaint system and have a set of goals to assess its
efficacy.
The resource competition between complaints and other activities is the
first way that complaint handling may erode the overall level of consumer
protection. If other activities that are less resource-intensive would be more
effective, the CFPB is limiting its ability to improve the marketplace by
dealing with individuals’ problems. The paradox that helping consumers
could actually be hurting consumer protection could occur in at least two
other ways.
By channeling complaints to business, the CFPB may be giving
industry an opportunity to head off litigation. Industry can provide modest
recompense (that still meets the CFPB’s definition of relief) and make its
potential plaintiffs satisfied enough. That is, there should be an inverse
relationship between the strength of a complaint mechanism and the amount
of private litigation. That relationship is not problematic if complaints have
the same ability to provide restitution for consumers and deter bad acts that
litigation outcomes do. That proposition is somewhat dubious, however,
and is in part the exact reason why many consumer protection statutes
provide for punitive damages and class actions.123
The other way that a complaint mechanism can erode consumer
protection is if it provides insufficient relief or is understaffed. If the
government receives complaints but does not deliver relief, consumers may
erroneously believe that they have no legal claim. Not all consumers would
be deterred by a lack of response from the government, but some portion
almost certainly would. This could lower the overall threat of litigation and
its deterrent effect on businesses. In the absence of a complaint mechanism,
some consumers would file lawsuits in the first instance because they would
not be discouraged by the complaint experience from doing so.

122. Before you Submit a Complaint, FTC, https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov (last visited
Nov. 12, 2012).
123. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006) (providing for class action); Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006) (providing for punitive damages).
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CONCLUSION
Although the CFPB is a new agency, the problems that it will face in
handling complaints are old. In the 1970s, a researcher found government
complaint units fit the same “dismal pattern” as private, industry-run
complaint systems.124 She explained that, “Dependent on the government
for its continued existence, a public complaint agency has little or no
incentive to respond to grievances, and instead may divide the community,
lower complainants’ expectations, and continue to be perceived as
legitimate despite its inadequate resolution of complaints.”125 The future
will provide the CFPB with the opportunity to break from this tradition of
unsatisfactory outcomes when the government handles complaints that
consumers have with businesses.
To date, the CFPB has developed innovative strategies to achieve
excellence in carrying out many of its duties. The complaint system,
however, may prove to be a conundrum for the CFPB. There are few
successful models to consider for inspiration. The resource costs of
handling complaints are high. The expectations of Congress and consumers
for the CFPB may be unreasonable and almost certainly are ill-defined. On
the bright side, the CFPB is a unique agency, born of a crisis and being
designed in a world of new technology. Its work to date with complaints
suggests that it may chart a new path forward for government complaint
systems.

124. Nader, supra note 25, at 1006.
125. Id. at 1010–11.

